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    Phishing Simulation Programmes: Beyond the Click Rate

    Jaouhar Mosbahi5 February 20267 min read

    Phishing simulation programmes have become a standard component of enterprise security awareness efforts. Nearly every organisation with a security programme runs some form of simulated phishing, sending crafted emails to employees and tracking who clicks. Yet most programmes fixate on a single metric: the click rate. How many people fell for it? This quarter's click rate was 12 percent, down from 15 percent last quarter, and the security team celebrates. But this metric, while easy to measure and report, tells you remarkably little about your organisation's actual resilience to phishing attacks. Worse, an over-emphasis on click rate can create perverse incentives that undermine the programme's effectiveness.

    The fundamental problem with click rate as a primary metric is that it measures failure rather than success. It tells you how many people fell for a simulated attack. It does not tell you how many people recognised the attack and reported it. It does not tell you how quickly the report was made. It does not tell you whether the security team could have used that report to prevent a real attack from spreading. In a real phishing scenario, the organisation's survival depends not on whether zero people click, which is unrealistic, but on whether the attack is detected and reported quickly enough for the security team to respond before significant damage occurs.

    Reporting rate is the metric that actually matters. If a phishing email lands in 1,000 inboxes and 30 people click but 200 people report it within the first hour, the security team has actionable intelligence to protect the other 800 recipients. Conversely, if 30 people click and only 5 report, the security team is operating blind. A high reporting rate means the organisation has a security-aware culture where employees are active participants in the defence. They recognise suspicious emails, they know how to report them, the reporting mechanism is easy to use, and they trust that reporting will lead to action rather than being ignored.

    Designing realistic simulations is critical to programme credibility and effectiveness. Simulations should reflect the actual phishing threats your organisation faces, not generic 'click here to claim your prize' messages that insult employees' intelligence. Study your email gateway logs to understand what real phishing attempts look like when they target your organisation. Design simulations that mimic current threat trends: business email compromise, credential harvesting through fake login pages, supply chain phishing from compromised vendor domains, and targeted spear phishing using information from LinkedIn and company websites. The simulations should be challenging enough to be instructive without being so deceptive that they erode trust in internal communications.

    The 'gotcha' approach to phishing simulation is counterproductive and should be avoided entirely. Programmes that use trick emails designed to entrap employees, then immediately display a shame screen listing what they did wrong, create fear and resentment rather than awareness. Employees who feel tricked become hostile to the programme, less likely to report genuine suspicious emails for fear of being wrong, and more likely to view security as an adversary rather than an ally. The simulation should be followed by a supportive, educational moment: a brief explanation of the indicators that could have identified the email as suspicious, a reminder of how to report suspicious emails, and positive reinforcement for those who did report.

    Frequency and escalation should be thoughtfully designed. Running simulations too frequently leads to fatigue and cynicism. Running them too infrequently means employees forget between exercises. A monthly simulation cadence works well for most organisations, with variation in difficulty, technique, and timing to prevent predictability. The difficulty should be calibrated to the organisation's maturity: start with more obvious phishing indicators and progressively increase sophistication as the organisation's detection capability improves. This graduated approach ensures that employees are consistently challenged without being overwhelmed.

    Handling repeat offenders constructively is one of the most sensitive aspects of a phishing simulation programme. Some employees will click on simulated phishing emails repeatedly despite training. The instinct is often punitive: restrict their access, escalate to their manager, or mandate remedial training in a way that feels like punishment. This approach is counterproductive. Repeat offenders are often employees who are overworked, distracted, or lack the technical background to distinguish phishing from legitimate communications. They need targeted support, not sanctions. A constructive approach includes one-on-one coaching sessions that walk through the specific simulation they clicked on, identification of patterns in when and how they interact with email, practical tips tailored to their workflow and role, and follow-up simulations to reinforce learning.

    Integrating phishing simulations with broader security awareness training creates a reinforcing cycle. The simulation identifies specific areas where employees struggle, and the training programme addresses those areas. If a credential-harvesting simulation reveals that many employees do not check URLs before entering credentials, the next training module should focus specifically on URL verification. If a business email compromise simulation succeeds because employees do not verify unusual requests through a second channel, the training should emphasise out-of-band verification procedures. This data-driven approach to training content ensures that awareness education addresses actual gaps rather than generic security topics.

    Measuring culture change over time requires a dashboard of complementary metrics that go beyond click rate. Key metrics should include reporting rate, the percentage of simulation recipients who report the email through the designated channel. Report time, measuring how quickly reports come in after the simulation is sent, is another critical metric. The click-to-report ratio, the relationship between those who click and those who report, reveals whether the organisation's instinct is to engage with suspicious content or to flag it. Repeat offender trend, tracking whether repeat offenders improve over time, shows programme effectiveness at the individual level. Training completion rates, voluntary engagement with security awareness resources, and qualitative feedback from employees round out the picture.

    Achieving low compromise rates is possible but requires sustained effort and a holistic programme. In our experience, organisations that combine realistic simulations with targeted training, supportive repeat offender management, and a strong reporting culture can achieve compromise rates as low as 2.27 percent, significantly below industry averages that typically range from 10 to 15 percent for well-run programmes. But the compromise rate alone does not tell the story. The real achievement is when the reporting rate exceeds 50 percent, meaning that more than half of your employees actively contribute to the organisation's phishing defence by flagging suspicious emails.

    The technical infrastructure supporting the programme matters more than many organisations realise. The phishing report button should be prominent, available in all email clients including mobile, and should provide immediate positive feedback to the reporter. Reports should flow to a monitored queue where the security team or a managed service provider can triage them and provide feedback on whether the reported email was a simulation or a genuine threat. This feedback loop is essential: when employees see that their reports lead to action, they are more likely to continue reporting. When reports disappear into a void, the reporting behaviour extinguishes.

    Programme governance should include regular review of simulation content, metrics, and approach. Quarterly reviews with security leadership should assess whether the programme is achieving its objectives, whether the metrics are trending in the right direction, whether simulation content reflects current threat intelligence, and whether any adjustments are needed to frequency, difficulty, or training integration. Annual reviews should evaluate the programme's overall impact on security culture and recommend strategic adjustments for the following year. Like any security control, the phishing simulation programme should be part of the continuous improvement cycle.

    Legal and ethical considerations should not be overlooked. In some jurisdictions, phishing simulations may have data protection implications, particularly if they involve collecting and processing data about employee behaviour. Ensure that your programme is covered by appropriate policies, that employees are aware that simulations may occur even if specific timing is not disclosed, that the data collected is used solely for security improvement purposes, and that the programme has been reviewed by legal and HR stakeholders. Transparency about the programme's existence and purpose, while maintaining surprise about specific simulations, is the appropriate balance.

    Phishing simulations are not a standalone solution. They are one component of a comprehensive human risk management strategy that includes security awareness training, policy communication, secure-by-design processes that reduce reliance on human vigilance, and technical controls that prevent phishing emails from reaching inboxes in the first place. The most effective organisations layer these controls: technical controls catch the majority of phishing, trained employees catch what gets through, and a strong reporting culture ensures that the security team has visibility into the threats that reach the inbox. The simulation programme measures and strengthens the human layer in this defence-in-depth approach.

    PhishingSecurity AwarenessSecurity CultureTraining